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Articles
COLE V. B URNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SER VICES 1:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
by John A. Gray
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Clinton Cole ("Cole") worked for Bums
International Security Services, Inc. ("Bums
International") as a security guard assigned to Union
Station in Washington, D.C. Bums International
required its new and continuing employees to sign,
as a condition of employment, an agreement under
which (1) both the employer and the employee
mutually waived the right to a trial by jury in the
event that there was employment related litigation
between them, and (2) the employer had the right to
compel mandatory arbitration of any employment
related issue within sixty days of a complaint filed
by the employee.' The terms of this agreement in
effect required an employee to initiate a lawsuit
against the employer. The employer then had the
option to litigate the dispute or to compel arbitration.
If the employer chose to litigate, the employee could
not request a jury trial.
Bums International fired Cole. After filing
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), Cole filed suit in federal
1 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "This case raises important
questions regarding whether and to what extent a person can
be required, as a condition of employment [sic], to (1) waive
all rights to a trial by jury in a court of competent jurisdiction
with respect to any dispute relating to recruitment,
employment, or termination, including claims involving laws
against discrimination, and (2) sign an agreement that, at the
employer's option, any such employment disputes must be
arbitrated." Id. at 1467.
2 See id. at 1469 for the exact language of the "Pre-dispute
Resolution Agreement" signed by Cole.
I The right to a jury trial in cases of intentional discrimination
did not exist until granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the American
Disabilities Act of 1990.
district court on the grounds of racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Bums International moved for dismissal on
grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction under the
terms of the employment agreement with Cole. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia granted Bums International's motion to
compel arbitration and rejected Cole's claims that
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1,
excluded the agreement from coverage, and that the
agreement was an unconscionable, unenforceable
contract of adhesion.4
The United States Court of Appeals addressed
the following four issues: (1) whether Section 1 of
the FAA excluded this employment agreement;5 (2)
whether the agreement was enforceable6 because it
met the requirements of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation;7 (3) whether
a pre-dispute mandatory employment arbitration
agreement is enforceable if it requires the employee
to pay part or all of arbitrator-related expenses -- an
issue raised sua sponte;s and (4) whether it was
unconscionable because the scope of judicial review
of arbitral awards was adequate to assure an
"effective vindication of statutory rights."9 The
court did not address the terms of the agreement
under which both the employer and the employee
waived their right to a jury in the event of a trial
because neither party raised this issue.'
Interesting aspects of this opinion are that it
includes a lengthy discussion of the differences
See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470.
See id at 1470-72.
6 See id at 1480-83.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-86.
9 See id. at 1486-87.
"0 See id. at 1473 n.4.
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between arbitration in the collective bargaining
context and the non-union context.1' It also reviews
the positions of the EEOC, 2 the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB"), 3  the Dunlop
Commission, 4  and a number of arbitral
organizations"5 on the issue of the legality and
wisdom of pre-dispute employment agreements
requiring arbitration of statutory employment
claims.
FIRST ISSUE: FAA §1 Exclusiod 6
The issue was whether Congress, when it
enacted the FAA in 1925, intended to exclude all
employment contracts from its coverage (broad
construction) or to exclude only certain employment
contracts (narrow construction). The Cole court
held 7 that Section 1 of the FAA excluded from its
coverage only employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce. Therefore, the federal policy
in favor of arbitration 8 applied to this employment
agreement. The court adopted the narrow
construction and articulated four reasons for its
holding.
See id. at 1473-79.
12 See id. at 1479.
'3 See id.
"4 See id at 1483 n.l 1 and 1488. The Department of Labor
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
("Dunlop Commission")(1944).
" Id. For example, the American Arbitration Association,
JAMS/Endispute, the Center for Alternative Dispute
Resolution.
16 FAA § 1 states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. §1 (1994).
'7 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
IS FAA §2 provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.
§2 (1994).
First, the court relied on two "well-established
canons of statutory construction."' 9 One is that
courts should avoid a reading that renders some
words altogether redundant. "Here if the final phrase
of the exclusionary clause .. .extended to all
workers whose jobs have any effect on commerce,
the specific inclusion of seamen and railroad
workers would have been unnecessary."2 The
second canon, the rule of ejusdem generis, limits
general terms that follow specific ones to matters
similar to those specified. Thus, in applying the
canon to this case, the interpretation would be
limited only to those workers likewise actually
engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce.2' Second, every circuit to consider this
issue has adopted the narrow construction of the
exclusion.2 Third, while the Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue, the Cole court reasoned that the
decisions in Allied Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson23
and Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane 24 suggest that
the Supreme Court also would adopt the narrow
construction.25 Finally, the court recognized that the
legislative history could be read to support a broad
construction, but took the position that "in a case
such as this, where the statutory text does not admit
of serious ambiguity, and where firmly established
case law is absolutely clear on the meaning of the
statute, legislative history is, at best, secondary, and,
at worst, irrelevant."26
The court also noted that even if it was incorrect
in adopting the narrow construction, the agreement
was still a contract and probably enforceable under
the common law of contract and state arbitration
19 Cole, 150 F.3d at 1470.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 1471.
22 See id. The Court cited the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 7th circuits.
23 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
24 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
25 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1472.
26 Id.
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 30
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statutes.27 The court, however, did not resolve this
issue in light of its FAA § 1 holding.
SECOND ISSUE: Enforceability under Gilmer 8
As a preamble to its searching examination of
the details of the agreement in light of its
understanding of Gilmer, the court developed at
length its view on the differences between
arbitration in the collective bargaining context and
arbitration in the non-union context. It concluded
that courts do not owe the same degree of judicial
deference to arbitration agreements and awards in
the non-union context as they do to those in the
union, collective bargaining context. 9
To this court, Gilmer stands for the proposition
that a pre-dispute employment agreement requiring
binding arbitration of statutory discrimination claims
as a condition of employment is as enforceable as
any other contract provision, so long as the specific
arbitration process under the agreement provides to
the employee a forum "to effectively vindicate
statutory rights."3 The Supreme Court in Gilmer
upheld the New York Stock Exchange arbitration
procedure as sufficient to provide such a forum.3'
In Cole, the parties agreed to the following five
propositions:32
(1) the agreement allows the employer the
option of forcing statutory claims into
arbitration for the resolution of public law
issues;
21 See id. For example, the Maryland Arbitration Statute
applies to employment agreements. See also MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC., §3-206(a); Wilson v. McGrow, Pridgeon
& Co., 298 Md. 66, 467 A.2d 1025 (1983).
28 "We turn now to the heart of the problem in this case, i.e.,
the enforceability of conditions of employment requiring
individual employees to use arbitration in place ofjudicial fora
for the resolution of statutory claims." Id.
29 See id. at 1473-78.
10 Id. at 1481.
3' See id at 1481-82 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
32 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480.
(2) the agreement's waiver of a jury trial is
absolute, i.e., it operates even if the
employer does not seek arbitration;
(3) the agreement does not affect an
employee's ability to seek relief from the
EEOC;33
(4) the arbitrator is fully bound to apply Title
VII and other applicable public law, both
as to substance and remedy, in accordance
with statutory requirements and prevailing
judicial interpretation; 34 and
(5) the agreement provides for appointment of
a neutral arbitrator through the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") and for
the conduct of the arbitration proceeding
in accordance with AAA rules.
Since the agreement incorporated the AAA National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes,
the court undertook a close examination of each and
concluded:
We believe that all of the factors addressed in
Gilmer are satisfied here. In particular we
note that the arbitration arrangement (1)
provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides
for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires
a written award, (4) provides for all the types
of relief that would otherwise be available in
court, and (5) does not require employees to
pay either unreasonable cost or any
arbitrator's fees or expenses as a condition of
access to the arbitration forum. Thus, an
3 In Gilmer the court recognized the right of the plaintiff to
file a complaint with the EEOC to seek an administrative
action against the employer but not the right to have the EEOC
seek compensatory relief for the plaintiff because that was
available under the arbitration agreement.
14 The agreement requires the arbitrator to apply substantive
law, unlike those discussed in Murray S. Levin, The Role of
Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of
Volition, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 105 (Fall 1997). The arbitration
process required by the Cole agreement seems to be more like
"private judging" on the spectrum of dispute resolution
techniques than traditional arbitration as analyzed by Professor
Levin.
15 See Cole, 150 F.3d at 1480.
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 31
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employee who is made to use arbitration as a
condition of employment "effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum."36
THIRD ISSUE: Arbitrator Fees37
The third issue addressed in Cole was raised by
the court sua sponte. The court found the AAA rules
to be ambiguous on the point of which party is
responsible for paying arbitrator fees and, using the
contra proferentum rule of contracts, held that the
AAA rule was to be interpreted to require only the
employer to pay arbitrator expenses.38 The court
reasoned that when arbitration occurs only at the
option of the employer, and that option has been
imposed as a condition of employment by the
employer, the employer alone should bear the cost
of the arbitrator's expenses.3 9 Moreover, because a
plaintiff does not have to pay the salary of a judge to
pursue statutory claims in court, the employee
likewise should not be required to pay any or all of
the arbitrator's fees and expenses. However, the
agreement may require the employee to pay other
reasonable administrative fees incurred by the
arbitration.4" The court held
that Cole could not be required to agree to
arbitrate his public law claims as a
condition of employment if the arbitration
agreement required him to pay all or part
of the arbitrator's fees and expenses. In
light of this holding, we find that the
arbitration agreement in this case is valid
and enforceable. 4
36 Id. at 1482.
" "We use the term 'arbitrator's fees' to include not only the
arbitrator's honorarium, but also the arbitrator's expenses and
any other costs associated with the arbitrator's services." Id.
at 1484 n.15.
" See id. at 1485-86.
'9 See id. at 1485.
40 See id. at 1484.
41 Id.
FOURTH ISSUE: Scope of Judicial Review42
Cole argued that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable because arbitrator's rulings were not
subject to judicial review. The court recognized
three distinct bases for judicial review: (1) the FAA
§ 10 (a) states four grounds for vacating an arbitral
award;43 (2) awards may be set aside when they are
found to be contrary to "some explicit public
policy";" and (3) awards can be vacated when they
are found to be in "manifest disregard of the law."45
The court was of the opinion that
in the vast majority of cases, judicial review
of legal determinations to ensure compliance
with public law should have no adverse
impact on the arbitration process.
Nonetheless, there will be some cases in
which novel or difficult legal issues are
presented demanding judicial judgment. In
such cases, the courts are empowered to
review an arbitrator's award to ensure that its
resolution of public law issues is correct.4"
CONCLUDING COMMENT
Whom does this decision benefit? Although
waiver of the right to a jury trial was not addressed,
this waiver probably benefits an employer-
42 See id. at 1486-87.
41 (1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of the parties have been
prejudiced. (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter was not made. See
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486 (citing 9 U.S.C. §10 (a)).
44 Id. at 1486.
45 Id.
46 See id at 1487.
29.1 U. Balt. L. F. 32
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option of the employer clearly benefits the employer
since the employer is able to choose which disputes
it prefers to litigate and which to arbitrate. However,
because arbitration is selection of a forum and not a
surrender of rights or remedies, an early arbitral
award in favor of an employee may be preferable to
an award at the conclusion of administrative and
judicial proceedings. One may also wonder whether
this court's understanding of the scope of judicial
review of pre-dispute employment agreements
mandating arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims does not, in effect, eliminate the
characteristic trait of the finality of arbitral awards.
Those who think that Gilmer and its progeny are
unwise should (a) encourage Cole and similar losing
plaintiffs to appeal to the United States Supreme
Court and submit amicus curiae briefs in support of
reversal and/or (b) form a coalition of employee
interest groups to lobby Congress to amend the FAA
to exclude all employment contracts from its
coverage and to state that all such conditions of
employment are unenforceable as a matter of public
policy.
About the Author: John A. Gray is currently a
professor of Law and Social Responsibility at
Loyola College of Maryland, and is a member of the
Maryland and federal bars. Mr. Gray also serves as
an arbitrator with the American Arbitrator
Association and the National Association of
Securities Dealers. Additionally, he volunteers for
the Maryland Human Relations Commission and the
Baltimore District Office of the EEOC as a
mediator. His writings have been published in
several journals, including The American Business
Law Journal, The Villanova Law Journal, and The
Labor Law Journal.
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 33
Articles
29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 34
The University of Baltimore Law Forum
Articles Solicitation
The University of Baltimore Law Forum is currently requesting articles for submission
relating to issues of importance in Maryland and/or Federal law.
Please contact or submit materials to:
Articles Editor
University of Baltimore Law Forum
The John and Frances Angelos Law Center
1420 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
(410) 837-4493
E-Mail: UBaltLF@hotmail.com
